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SUMMARY
In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court considers the evidence in the
light most favorable to the loosing party - in this case, Sandy City ("City").1 Appellees
McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's) and Salt Lake ( ounty ("County11) have filed briefs
on appeal. The theme of both briefs is that the Utah statutes, County ordinances, and rules
of procedure, which form the basis of this appeal, do not apply to them. They support this
motif on a startling construction of the evidence - sometimes fictitious but always in a light
most favorable to themselves

They hope, through such posture, to limit review of this

appeal to the narrowest possible scope.
Appellees' arguments are not valid. Nevertheless, it is possible that these allegations
may cause confusion or distraction from the issues. For this reason, the City has prepared
this reply.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLEES' BREFS REST ON MULTIPLE FICTIONS
A.

APPELLEES' LACHES ARGUMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE
Laches is an equitable defense consisting of these elements: (1) there must be a

showing of undue delay as a result of a clear lack of diligence; (2) there must be shown
some identifiable damage, injury, or prejudice which resulted directly from the unwarranted
delay. McDonald's acknowledges its burden to prove these elements2 but fails to cite
evidence justifying their application to this action.

1

Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

2

Brief of Appellee McDonald's Corporation, at p. 16.

Sandy Did Not Unduly Delay.
McDonald's brief poses the following two fictions to establish that the City unduly
delayed filing of this action:
Fiction No. 1 - That "Sandy knew McDonald's was purchasing the McDonald's
Parcel" and should have joined McDonald's as a defendant in its prior (Chevron)
action.3
Throughout the development approval process, McDonald's claimed that it did not
own the site. It professed to be acting only as an agent for the real property owners.4
This was later confirmed in part. McDonald's did not own its parcel at the time the
conditional use permit was approved5, at the time the Chevron action was filed6, or at the
time summary judgment was granted in the Chevron case.7
McDonald's incorrecdy asserts that it disclosed to the County that it was purchasing
the property and that the City was likewise informed.8 Its citations to the record do not
disclose any such thing.9 Rather, McDonald's counsel led both the County Commission
and the City to believe that it had not yet acquired an interest. December 9,1987 County
Commission minutes approving McDonald's development state:

3

McDonald's brief, at p. 17.

4

Record at 104.

5

December 9,1987.

6

This action challenged development on the entire 4.18 acre site. Third District Court Civil No. C87-07304
was initiated November 6, 1987, against the County, the Planning Commission, the property owners, Chevron
U.S.A. and its agent. R163-175.
7

Order of March 15,1988. Record at 199.

8

McDonald's brief, pp. 8-9.

9

McDonald's cites to Rue, 87-88, 97-99, 100-102, and 118-120.
2

"Commissioner Barker asked if the property is now owned by McDonald's, or
will it be?"
"Ms. Fierhelm [counsel for McDonald's] stated that it will be."10
McDonald's did eventually acknowledge it had executed an earnest money
agreement on October 12,1987.11 However, disclosure was withheld nearly a year - until
August 12,198812-- after the County had completed its review, after summary judgment was
granted in the Chevron case, and after the instant action had been filed. As a result,
investigation by the City at the time of the Chevron action failed to disclose a property
interest owned by McDonald's.13
McDonald's purpose in keeping its earnest money offer secret is transparent. It was
understandably reluctant to acknowledge that it had offered to pay $500,000 just for the
site,14 in light of the $750,000 urban development restriction. It may also have wanted to
support the owner's contention that he would develop the entire 4.18 acre tract, so that his
promises to the neighbors could appear to be honored.15
Regardless of McDonald's reasons for secrecy, the City could not rightly join

1U

Record at 85.

11

Id. at 105-115.

12

/d., at 100-102,118-120.

13

Id., at 323.6 and 323.10.

14

Id., at 105.

15

The owners of the tract promised that they would be the sole developers of the project and that the
entire site would proceed as a single development. Record at 89.
3

McDonald's in the Chevron action when it could not establish an interest peculiar to it.16
The real owners were already parties in the Chevron action and were represented by legal
counsel.
Nevertheless, the City recognized that McDonald's had claimed to be an
administrative agent for the property owners. Accordingly, it provided McDonald's notice
of all proceedings in the district court. These notices were intended to honor McDonald's
claim of agency and to expedite McDonald's intervention, if it acquired an interest sufficient
to do so.
McDonald's did not intervene in the prior action, either as an agent or as an owner.
Instead, it waited to purchase until after summary judgment had been granted.17 Even then
it did not tell the City it had acquired the property.18 The City did not learn of McDonald's
purchase until April 1988.19 By then, a final ruling had been made in the Chevron case and
it would have served no purpose to have named McDonald's in that action.
Thus, McDonald's claim that it should have been named in the Chevron action is not
supported by the evidence.

The City prudently chose not to subject McDonald's to

litigation costs since it had disclosed no interest in the property. Nevertheless, the City
kept McDonald's informed of each stage of the litigation in order that McDonald's could
intervene if it acquired an interest worth defending.

A relationship of interest in a conflict is required of one sought to be joined in an action. Young v.
Buchanan, 123 Utah 369, 259 P.2d 876, 878 (1953). Joinder of a party is not required where it is not shown to
have a joint interest in the action. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Oftce, 621 P.2d 1234,1236-37 (Utah 1980).
17

Record at 102, 535.

18

Its counsel only requested that its name be taken off the mailing matrix in the Chevron action. Affidavit
of Walter Miller, Exhibit "C." This exhibit is not paginated but appears at rear of Record, Vol. II.
19

Record at 6-7.
4

Armed with knowledge of the Chevron action, McDonald's could have disclosed its
earnest money agreement, acquired ownership, or, in its own name, moved to intervene.
It chose to do none of these. It provided the City no basis for action against it then -- it
should not now criticize the City for failing to detect its confidential agreements.
Fiction No. 2 - That the City "could observe construction of the Restaurant" and
could have initiated "a separate action before construction of the restaurant began.20
McDonald's states that construction of its fast-food outlet commenced on April 25,
1988 - 49 days before this action was filed. However, it gives no description of that activity
and it is impossible to determine what was meant by "construction" and whether it was
actually observable.
The City concedes that site work had commenced by late April. Its inspectors had
detected large-scale site work by April 22,1988. That work consisted of grading the entire
4.18 acre development and survey staking on large portions thereof.21 The property owners
(Yeates, Priest, Kjar, and Smoot) did this work as part of their overall development.22
On learning of the massive grading, the City immediately moved the district court
for an injunction. Since the entire site was under development and all known owners and
their property were already subject to the Chevron action, the motion was brought in that
case. That motion was designated Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal and was denied
on May 5, 1988.
The City apparently learned of construction specific to the McDonald's site the day

McDonald's brief, p. 17.
The scale of this work is detailed in the Affidavit of Robert J. Ellis, on file in the Chevron Action..
Record at 107, 323.19. The owners had contracted to deliver a fully improved site.
5

its motion for an injunction was denied.23 It immediately informed counsel for McDonald
that it would seek enforcement action through the County to halt construction.24
On May 10, 1988, the City petitioned the County Attorney to enjoin further
development on the McDonald's site. The following day, the City mailed a letter to
counsel for McDonald, confirming that it was seeking further enforcement action against
the McDonald project and that if the City was unsuccessful in that effort, it would institute
further legal action to enjoin development of the project.25
On May 27, 1988, the City received a response from the County Attorney refusing
to enjoin the development. The City filed this action 16 days later.
The foregoing does not describe a City unduly delaying litigation; it describes a City
attempting to resolve a dispute at the lowest administrative level; of bringing litigation
promptly when necessary; of measuring the litigation to avoid costs to those without
interests; and of keeping persons with a potential interest informed of all proceedings in
order that they may assert an interest when and if acquired.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the City, there is no basis to
conclude that the City unduly delayed litigation or otherwise acted imprudently.
Injury Did Not Result From City Delay.

McDonald's appeal brief asserts as

damages both costs of litigation and the risk that McDonald's may be required to comply
with Sandy zoning or building codes.26 However, in its hundreds of pages of submissions

** Record at 30.
24

Id., at 30.

25

Id.y at 30-31.

26

Id.
6

to the District court, McDonald's provided no evidence of any injury.27
It is irrational to assert that a failure to join McDonald's in the Chevron action
increased litigation costs, without offering some evidence of that fact. Litigation costs
generally result from filing actions, not from failing to do so. In any case, McDonald's
could have joined in the Chevron action but did not. McDonald's was well informed in
making that decision and should not now ask the City to take responsibility for it.
McDonald's also claims as injury the risk that it may be required to comply with
Sandy zoning or building codes.28 Again, it offers no evidence of such a contingency. It
merely asserts that the City may preclude all commercial activity on the site.
The record does not support the allegation that McDonald's would be denied the
right to operate under City zoning. The City has been concerned about commercial use
of this corner, but the issue is not closed. It has approved commercial development on all
four corners of many intersections.29

The City's Planning Commission invited the

developers to meet in public hearing and discuss zoning options on the property.30
McDonald's also has the right to make an administrative appeal of any unfair enforcement
decision.31

*' Brief of Appellant (City) at 10-11.
28

Id.

29

Record at 40. Testimony of Wayne Mickelson.

30

"Commissioner Steward asked Mr. Miller [City Attorney] if Sandy City is currently considering their
ordinance to have intersections contain more than one quadrant of commercial development. Mr. Miller said
yes, in a sense. The Chairman of the Planning Commission is here, they had such strong feelings expressed by
the developers in this case, and the allegations that Sandy City was inconsistent in their approach of that, they
set for hearing before the Planning Commission and invited them through their council(sic), to meet with them
and say if there was something wrong the way they are doing this." Record at 42.
31

UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-12.

7

McDonald's supposed injuries are speculative and fictitious. It knew its use permit
would end up in court and asked the County Commission to "allow the court to determine
what urban development is."32 It knew that the City had filed an action against the entire
development, had moved for an injunction following summary judgment, and had petitioned
the County Attorney to halt construction. McDonald's also knew - because it was told that the City would file a civil action if the County Attorney failed to act.
Thus, McDonald's was not commencing construction on the expectation of no further
legal challenge. It was proceeding knowingly, in the face of certain litigation. Its purpose
appears to have been strategic - a gamble only large corporations can afford to make.
Construed in the light most favorable to the City, McDonald's was apparently rushing to
complete construction before action was commenced, recognizing the reluctance a reviewing
court or City officials would have to undo such a decision.
McDonald's brief brings that strategy to fruition. It has skillfully used the complete
construction of its building, as the basis to claim it has been harmed. However, in so doing
it has glossed over the record, traded on the margin of fact, and framed all events in the
light most favorable to itself. Under well established principles of appellate review, such
strategy and construction merits remand in order that a full factual review can proceed.
B.

APPELLEES' BRIEFS ARE BASED ON A SUPERFICIAL AND ERRONEOUS
DEVELOPMENT MODEL WHICH CASTS FACTS IN LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THEMSELVES.
McDonald's suggests that the City has no right to concern itself with what

development occurs within its unincorporated islands. It characterizes the City's motives
as political maneuvering in the context of a petty jurisdictional dispute but offers no

Record at 85.

8

supportive evidence.33

More importantiy, its assertion distorts the real problems which

have been caused by Salt Lake County's development policies.
1.

Salt Lake County is not a Utah Municipality but is in Active Competition with

Utah Cities in Contravention of Sound Legislative Policy.
Utah's Constitution establishes a plan under which urban service delivery is managed.
Cities are empowered to provide the full range of urban services necessary for urban
development.34 City officials are elected and closely scrutinized to insure that community
interests are considered and balanced in a coordinated manner.
Counties also play a role under our constitutional model, but their powers to provide
and fund urban services are strictly limited.35 Salt Lake County seems to have found a path
around these limits. Contrary to the constitutional model, Salt Lake County promotes
urban development but then leaves the bulk of service delivery to limited function districts.
While this increases the County's tax base, it creates enormous governance problems.
2.

Past Consequences of Salt Lake County's Development Policies Illustrate why
the Urban Development Statute must now be Honored.

The proliferation of special purpose districts has created serious local governance
problems in Utah. These districts exercise limited functions and operate apart from general
units of local government such as cities and counties. The territorial jurisdiction of districts
often overlap, creating difficult problems particularly in metropolitan areas.36
Special districts handle each aspect of service delivery as a free-wheeling entity.

McDonald's brief, p. 33.
Article XI, Section 5.
£££. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 113 (Utah 1985).
Robert W. Swensen, MA Primer of Utah Water Law: Part II," 1985 Utah Law Review 1, 38.
9

Once created they take on a life of their own, proliferating and overlapping; disconnected
from and independent of public interests or control. Their relevance is rarely re-examined
as their bureaucracies grow- an ever increasing hinderance to popular authority.
Salt Lake County poses the most serious problem. At least twelve full-function cities
and towns exist in this county. Salt Lake County also engages in the municipal service
delivery business. Nevertheless, at least nineteen special purpose districts have been
organized to duplicate municipal functions and complicate the local government puzzle:
The anomalous result is the existence of thirty-one units of local government
attempting to meet the needs of an area whose topography is uniform and
whose population is constantly becoming more evenly distributed as
suburbanization makes its rapid advance.37
Bad government results from these policies:
Are there any logical bases for dividing into special districts
governmental functions and responsibilities in a relatively compact area such
as the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area, where nearly half of Utah's population
is concentrated? A few examples from the report of the Local Government
Survey Commission, which recently completed a factual study of local
government structure in Utah, provide the obvious answer. Unnecessary
expenses are incurred because special districts employ their own legal counsel,
thereby duplicating functions of the city or county attorney's office. Expenses
are further increased because there is no central purchasing authority, and,
consequently, none of the economies of large-scale purchasing are realized.
Duplicate purchases of equipment and the necessary maintenance facilities
as well as duplication of personnel also increase costs. Taxpayers in some
instances are subject simultaneously to as many as five local government
authorities. In such confusion taxpayers sometimes do not even receive the
specific service the district is supposed to provide. For example, in the
suburban areas southeast of Salt Lake City, taxpayers have to purchase water
from ten private water companies, as well as from Salt Lake City, and at the
same time are taxed by the Salt lake County Water Conservancy District,
from which they receive no water. The compilers of the report felt that the
latter situation was "close to double taxation," and the inequality of the
situation does seem obvious."38
6

Benson, "Special Districts and Deficient Local Government in the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area," 7 Utah
Law Review 209 (1960).
38

Id., at 212.
10

In 1979, the Utah Legislature adopted a statute which prohibits the County from
approving urban development within one-half mile of a City's boimdaries. The purpose of
this statute is to avoid double taxation and the proliferation of special districts.39
The Legislature has also recognized that urban growth is critical to the economic
welfare of our state.40

Development ordinarily occurs from the expansion of city

boundaries. Through this means, vital services are brought to areas of growth potential or
undergoing development impact.
Because city services follow municipal annexation, actions which block the growth
of city boundaries also retard municipal service delivery. Generally, where such services
are stopped, orderly growth cannot occur.
When Salt Lake County sponsors commercial development in unincorporated areas
along the boarders of cities and in unincorporated islands, it permits such developers to
avail themselves of lower County development standards and cheaper costs. However,
because a city cannot annex so as to leave an island of unincorporated area, these
commercial developments, which resist annexation, restrict growth along the entire length
of a city boundary.
When city growth is halted, so also is full and efficient municipal service delivery to
many developing areas. If the urban development statute is not followed in its express
terms, growth of cities throughout our state will be severely retarded, as all counties are

d9

UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-401 (3) states "[mjunidpal boundaries should be extended, in accordance with
specific standards, to include areas where a high quality of urban governmental services is needed and can be
provided for the protection of public health, safety and welfare and to avoid the inequities ofdouble taxation and
the proliferation of special service districts." Emphasis added.
40

UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-401(1).
11

then encouraged to follow Salt Lake County's example in competing with cities to lower
development standards in exchange for tax base.
The seriousness of the issue on appeal should not be trivialized as a petty political
dispute. The implications of the court's decision are far too severe.
3.

McDonald's is not the Passive Developer Characterized by Appellees but is
a Shopper for the Least Restrictive Laws. Such Actions Undermine
Comprehensive Urban Planning and Should be Discouraged.

McDonald's characterizes itself as an innocent citizen caught in a battle of
jurisdictions. However, McDonald's is not the passive player it suggests. It can more
accurately be characterized as a developer shopping between local governments for the
least restrictive development standards.
When developers are able to pit jurisdictions against one another to see which will
offer the lowest development standard in exchange for tax base, comprehensive urban
planning is destroyed. Uses of land, such as those of McDonald's, which do not conform
to the comprehensive plans of the community, have been a source of deep concern to
legislators and planners. These nonconforming uses limit the effectiveness of land-use
controls and share responsibility for the blight which has infected many urban areas.41

41

Anderson, American Law of Zoning, Second Edition, Volume 1, p. 357.
12

Municipal attorneys,42 urban planners,43 and law review commentators44 agree that
nonconforming uses imperil the success of community plans and injure property values.
Sandy City's own erratic boundaries are the best illustration of how comprehensive
urban planning is undermined \tfien developers are permitted to shop between jurisdictions:

SANDY CJTY BOUNDARY MAP
HyiSLANDS TO BE ANNEXED IF PETITIONED
yfy AREAS TO BE CONSIDERED IF PETITIONED
H i IN DISPUTE

42

Messer, Non-conprming Uses, Municipalities and the Law in Action, p. 347 (1951).

43

Lewis, A New Zoning Han pr the District of Columbia, p. 112 (1956).

44

Summary of Utah Law: Land Use, Zoning and Eminent Domain, BYU Journal of Legal Studies (19790,
p. 151; Comment, 7 Bailor Law Review, p. 73 (1955); Comment, 102 University of Pennsylvania, p. 91 (1953);
Comment, 1 Buffalo Law Review, p. 286 (1952); Comment, 9 University of Chicago Law Review, p. 477 (1942);
Mendelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming Use; Judicial Restriction on the Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 Drake Law
Review, p. 23 (1958); Norton, Elimination of Nonconforming Uses and Structures, 20 Law & Contemporary
Problems, p. 305 (1955); O'Reilly, The Nonconforming Use and Due Process of Law, 23 Georgetown Law
Journal, p. 218 (1935); Young, Regulation and Removal of Nonconforming Uses, 12 Western Reserve Law Review,
p. 681 (1961).
45

Record at 25.
13

McDonald's has understandably acted in its self-interest in seeking out lower County
standards. However, such actions vitiate legislative policy and statutes and destroy the
City's capacity to meet its own urban service delivery responsibilities.

The urban

development statute was intended to encourage higher standards of urban development by
prohibiting county development along city boimdaries. McDonald's should not be permitted
to undermine that statute by posturing as innocence offended.
In reviewing a summary judgment, this court considers the evidence in the light most
favorable to the loosing party - Sandy City.48 Contrary to this principle, appellees' briefs
seem to suggest quite the opposite standard. They construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to themselves. Such characterizations are fictional and should be rejected by the
Court.
POINT II
UTAH LAW COUNTERS APPELLEES'
LEGAL "AUTHORITIES"
A.

THERE IS NO 30-DAY LIMIT FOR BRINGING DISTRICT COURT ACTIONS
The City's action seeks three types of relief: declaratory judgment,47 injunction,48 and

extraordinary writ.49 State statutes do not provide a limitation period specific to these
types of relief.
McDonald's argues for a judicially imposed 30-day appeal period on all declaratory

4b

Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

47

UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-33-1.

48

Rule 65A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

49

Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
14

relief, injunctions, and extraordinary writs. Such a ruling would dramatically limit public
access to the courts. The solitary authority posited by McDonald's for such a profound
initiative is an 1980 Oregon Court of Appeals decision, Emerson v. Deschutes Co. Bd. of
Commissioners™ in which a property owner allowed over 18 months to elapse before
taking formal action to challenge preliminary approval of a subdivision. The applicable
Oregon statute specifically limited the appellate review period to 60 days after preliminary
plat approval.
The property owner argued that he had not received notice of the subdivision
approval and should not have been held to the 60-day appeal period. However, the court
noted that he had still waited over a year after finally receiving notice before he petitioned
for mandamus. Under these circumstances, the court refused to waive the 60-day statutory
limitation saying "[w]e see no reason why this petitioner should be able to have more time
to vindicate his rights after receiving actual notice of government action affecting those
rights than does any other person challenging a local land use decision."
McDonald's claims that "[t]he facts in Emerson dirt similar to those in this case."
However, Emerson is distinguishable from this action in almost every respect:
(1)

Utah does not have a 60-day limitation period as Oregon does and Sandy

violated no other statutory period of limitation.
(2)

The time period between McDonald's conditional use approval and initiation

of this action is one-third the delay period in Emerson.
(3)

The petitioner in Emerson engaged in no formal action before or during his

appeal period. However, in this case, the City had filed an action challenging the entire

46 Or. App. 247, 610 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1980).
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development bepre the McDonald's approval was even given.51 That action was pending
at the time the McDonald's project was approved.
(4)

The developer in Emerson was the property owner at the time approval was

given. In this action, McDonald's did not acquire the property until more than 4 months
after approval was given. It concealed the earnest money offer it had made prior to that
time and did not disclose its interest to the City after the purchase.
(5)

The petitioner in Emerson was aware of development work on the site during

the period of delay but took no action.

When Sandy City learned of work on the

McDonald's site, it immediately moved for an injunction. When that failed to provide
relief, the City petitioned the County Attorney to take action, pursuant to his statutory
duties.
It is surprising that McDonald's uses Emerson as its flagship case to justify a
judicially created statute of limitations. The fact that the argument was made and the case
was even mentioned, belies the weakness of McDonald's legal position.
B.

LACHES SHOULD NOT APPLY

McDonald's relies on the case of Felix v. Supreme Court of County of Pima,52 for the
proposition that a delay of five months and seven days in filing a petition for an
extraordinary writ was unreasonable.53 McDonald's alleges a similar delay and prejudice
in this action.

The City filed its action challenging development on the entire 4.18 acres on November 6, 1987.,
McDonald's conditional use application was upheld and approved by the County Commission on December 9„
1987.
52

92 Ariz. 247, 375 P.2d 730.

53

McDonald's brief at 16-17.
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McDonald's misstates the Felix decision. The period of delay was not the focus of
the Court's decision - it acknowledged that "[o]ur statutes and rules do not limit the time
within which a petition for certiorari may be filed." It was the petitioner's inaction during
that period which caused the court to quash the writ of certiorari:
Laches is a question not merely of the running of time, but also of the
intervening change of position of one of the parties induced by the inaction
of the party against whom the defense is raised. Construction of the steel
tower by respondent during a period when petitioner made no efprt to obtain
review of the order of immediate possession, and no attempt to prevent this
construction, amounted to such a change of position by respondent. 54
In the instant action, the Sandy City made every effort to prevent project
construction.

It had filed an action challenging the entire development bepre the

McDonald's approval was even given.55 When it learned that construction was proceeding,
it immediately moved for an injunction. When these measures failed, the City petitioned
the county attorney to take action, pursuant to his statutory duties. When he refused, this
action was filed.
The court in Felix emphasized that to vacate the order of occupancy in that case
would require the condemnor to dismantie the structure it had erected on the land, only
to erect it again within a matter of months when the eminent domain proceedings were
completed. There is no evidence that such injury or irrationality attends the instant action.
The foregoing facts expose the misapplication of the Felix decision to this action.
McDonald's creative interpretation of that case should be rejected by the court.

Citations omitted. Emphasis added.
55

The City filed its action challenging development on the entire 4.18 acres on November 6, 1987.
McDonald's conditional use application was upheld and approved by the County Commission on December 9,
1987.
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C

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL WAS APPLIED PREMATURELY

Judge Uno ruled that Chevron's development did not constitute "urban
development," that Sandy did not clearly state that it would annex the subject property, that
the projected cost of the Chevron project was under $750,000, and that the Chevron
application should be considered as a single development, separate from the remainder of
the property.56
McDonald's and the County rely on Judge Uno's decision to assert collateral
estoppel.57 They contend that the City is precluded from rehtigating its willingness to annex
or the value of the McDonald's project, because these issues were determined on the merits
in the Chevron Action.
Judge Uno's decision was appealed by the City and the Court of Appeals has now
ruled.58 Sandy City v. Salt Lake County™ was filed June 7,1990, and bears directly on the
issue of collateral estoppel. A copy of that decision is attached hereto as Appendix "A"
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's findings against Sandy City on the issues of
project cost and willingness to annex, but it assigned a totally different rationale than that
used by the trial court.60
The City respectfully petitioned for rehearing that decision in part because the
principle issues on which the court reached its determination had not been briefed or

Record at 199.
McDonald's brief, p. 20; County brief, p. 9.
The appeal was sent to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court under its Hpour over" authority.
136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
/d., at 44.
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argued. A copy of the City's Petition for Rehearing is attached hereto as Appendix "B."
The basis for the City's petition was that the Court had avoided the merits of the action
based on a misunderstanding of the facts and standard of review. The principle basis of the
appeal court's ruling was not raised as an affirmative defense by any of the parties to the
action, nor was it ever briefed, argued, or considered by the parties, the agencies, or lower
court. Thus, the parties were entirely deprived of the opportunity to address the issue upon
which the decision was made.
The bar of collateral estoppel is not applicable where an action was not determined
on the merits or where the case was not completely, fully and fairly litigated.61 Under the
circumstances, McDonald's reliance on the Chevron decision is premature and misplaced.
D.
MCDONALD'S FIXTURES HAVE BECOME PART OF THE REALTY
AND WERE APPROPRIATELY APPRAISED AS A COST OF DEVELOPMENT.
Sandy introduced, both before the County and the District Court, an appraisal by a
licensed MAI showing costs of development exceeded $750,000. McDonald's argues that
the expert was qualified only in real estate appraising and should not have been entitled
to estimate costs or values of the building fixtures. McDonald's further contends that the
fixtures should not be considered as a cost of development in any case.
McDonald's seeks to limit the real estate appraisal and cost estimates to the bare
shell of the building. That shell was described at hearing as follows:
"A typical developer goes in and ties up a piece of property and builds a building
delivers to the tenants, what is called a white box, sheet rocked walls, dropped
ceilings and cement floors, this is the kind of shell that McDonald's will be delivering
to the franchise, it is the franchisee's responsibility to bring that property up to
operating capabilities, putting in their own fixtures, signs, etc. . . "62

County brief, p. 9.
Record at 41.
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McDonald's construction of what constitutes real estate and development costs is not
consistent with Utah law. In order to ascertain whether an improvement has been made
to real estate, courts look to whether there has been an annexation to the land, or to some
part of the realty; or a fixture appurtenant to it, and whether it was done with the intention
of making it a permanent part thereof.63
McDonald's suggestion that an MAI is only qualified to appraise "shells" and "white
boxes," is not consistent with Utah law which includes true fixtures as a part of realty. At
hearings before the County Commission, counsel for both McDonald's and Salt Lake
County repeatedly referred to these improvements as "fixtures" and "fixture costs."64 This
is undoubtedly because they are necessary to make the building "operational."65 Salt Lake
County appraises improvements as part of its tax appraisals on our homes and other red
property. It seems to consider itself to have the exclusive right to consider the value of
fixtures to real estate.
McDonald's and the County should not be permitted to alternate between restrictive
and expansive standards of real estate appraisal, simply to maximize their tax revenues. In
all cases, where improvements have been affixed to property in order to render it
operational, such fixtures should be included in the costs of development.
E.

WILLINGNESS TO ANNEX HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED

McDonald's contends that the City had failed to express a "willingness" to annex the

Daniels v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan, 111 P2d 1100,1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Record at 39, 43.
Record at 41, quoted above.
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subject property because "Sandy has not submitted any facts to support that conclusion."66
Assuming arguendo that such a declaration is required, the recent decision by the Utah
Court of Appeals in the Chevron case refutes that argument. The appeal court recognized
that the City had posed at least two bases on which to show flwillingness:" (1) promulgating
a general policy declaration indicating its willingness to annex the property, if petitioned,
along with twenty other parcels; and (2) its counsel's direct statement to the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission that it was willing to annex the property."67
The evidence referenced by the court of appeals was before the district court in this
action. The record in this action discloses a third occasion when the City declared its
willingness to annex At a hearing, held by Sandy to consider development of this site, the
City directly and publicly reiterated its willingness to annex the entire 4.18 acre tract:
"When the Chairman of the Planning Commission asked a representative of Sandy
City if they were willing to annex this into the City, they said yes they were . . . "68
McDonald's representation that no willingness was expressed offends the express
language of the statute which requires no such expression. It also contradicts the record
on appeal which demonstrates three discrete occasions when the City publicly declared its
willingness. Representations to the contrary by McDonald's cannot be supported legally or
factually and should not be entertained.
F.

MASTER PLAN COMPLIANCE HAS NOT BEEN MET

Salt Lake County cites Garland v. Salt Lake County** for the rule that it need not

McDonald's brief, p. 29.
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Record at 41. Testimony of DeLynn Yeates, the property owner and developer.
358 P.2d 633 (Utah 1961).
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comply with its own master plan for the area.70 That case confirms only that a State of
Utah statute does not require that a master plan be adopted before zoning ordinances can
be passed. The state statute reviewed in Garland is not at issue here. In the instant action,
the County's master plan had already been adopted. Further, the County's own ordinance
specifically requires compliance with the master plan. That ordinance states as follows:
"The planning commission shall not authorize a conditional use permit unless
the evidence presented is such as to establish . . . [t]hat the proposed use will
conform to the intent of the county master plan."71
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the failure of an agency of government to
conform its official actions to its own regulations is arbitrary and capricious. The Court has
said:
Defendants contend that the procedural rules are merely "guidelines," but
administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable and valid and
cannot be ignored by the agency to suit its own purposes. Such is the essence
of arbitrary and capricious action. Without compelling grounds for not
following its rules, an agency must be held to them.72
The County's failure to require evidence of compliance with its master plan, in the
face of clear evidence of noncompliance, was the essence of capriciousness and is the cause
of this otherwise unnecessary legal action. It should not be permitted to avoid its ordinance
obligations by diverting the Court to the distinctly different issue of its enabling powers
under state statute.

70

County brief, p. 18.

71

Record at 33. County Ordinance 19.84.090.

72

State, Etc. v. Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Ut. 1980).
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G.

PLANNING COMMISSION FINDINGS
DETERMINATIVE OF THIS ACTION

SHOULD

NOT

BE

McDonald's cites Salt Lake City Corp. v. Dept. of Employment Sec.,7Z for the
proposition that this Court should defer to the Planning Commission's findings. It contends
that such deference is justified when the question is technical "calling for the special
expertise of the agency."74
The qualifications of the County Planning Commission are set by statute. Each
commissioner must be a resident of the County and an owner of property therein.75 No
other qualifications are required and the record does not described any other actual
qualifications. Accordingly, there is no evidence of expertise to which deference could be
extended.
Statutory authority of the County to approve urban development is the central issue
in this case. Jurisdictional issues are not discretionary and judicial deference has no proper
place where the County lacks authority to act. The Supreme Court has confirmed that
review latitude is recognized only where counties act within their authority.
County zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of the
applicable zoning ordinances, and are not at liberty either to grant or deny
conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards. Within the
boundaries established by such standards, however, the zoning authority is
afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded a strong
presumption of validity. Where such decisions have been made, courts will
not interfere unless they are plainly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable or an
abuse of discretion.76

™ 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982).
74

McDonald's brief, p. 25, 27.

75

UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-2.

76

Thurston v. Cache Cty, 626 P.2d 440, 444-445 (Utah 1981). Emphasis added. See also, Peatross v. Board
of County Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), where the Court made clear that deference will be granted
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard only if the lower agency was "acting within the scope of its
23

This Court acts as a check on excesses of governmental power. The review standard
posed by respondents reverses that role. Instead of serving as a check on governmental
excesses, it becomes the validator of the same. It permits administrative agencies, without
apparent expertise or qualification, to define their own powers in the face of evidence
which consistently denies them such powers. The City respectfully requests that the Court
not accept the review standard so broadly posed by McDonald's and the County.
CONCLUSION
This reply is intended to be brief in order to minimize the volume of materials
before the Court. However, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, its is respectfully
submitted that the factual and legal inadequacies in the arguments posited in Appellees'
briefs require written response. When placed in the light of the actual facts and law, such
arguments underscore the existence of issues of fact which require adequate development.
Discovery is the appropriate means to resolve such issues. Summary judgment should be
vacated in order that discovery may proceed.
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of July, 1990.
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Walter R. Miller
Sandy City Attorney

authority."
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Leonard J. Lewis/ Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Chevron U.S.A./ Inc.
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Before Judges Bench/ Garff# and Jackson.
GARFF/ Judge:
Plaintiff Sandy City appeals the trial court's dismissal
of its action against defendants Salt Lake County, property
owners Yeates, Priest, Kjar, and Smoot, and developers
Postero-Blecker, Inc. (Postero-Blecker) and Chevron USA, Inc.
(Chevron). We affirm the trial court's dismissal of Sandy
City.'s action.
This action involves a 4.18-acre parcel of commercial
property located on the northwest corner of 10600 South and
1300 East in unincorporated Salt Lake County. The property

abuts Sandy Cityfs boundaries and is located within an
unincorporated "island" within Sandy City's limits. Since
1976, the county master plan and Sandy City plans have called
for rural residential uses of the property*
In 1979, Sandy City adopted a general annexation policy
declaration which, among other things, delineated twenty-one
unincorporated islands within the city boundaries which Sandy
City was willing to annex, including the present parcel.
According to Sandy City, this policy declaration requires
property owners to first attempt to annex to Sandy City,
thereby obviating the County's approval for development of
commercial property when the development cost is in excess of
$750,000.
On August 5, 1987, at the property owners* request, the
Salt Lake County Commission, without amending its master plan,
adopted a zoning ordinance which permitted commercial
development on the present property. Sandy City objected to
the rezoning but failed to appeal the decision.^
On August 26, 1987, Postero-Blecker, the agent for the
property owners and Chevron, applied to Salt Lake County for a
conditional use permit to build a Chevron service station, car
wash, and mini-convenience store on .7 acres of the property.
This application indicated that the estimated value of the
project was $250,000. The property owners also intended to
build a McDonald's restaurant on the property. On September
30, 1987, they filed another conditional use permit application
which valued the McDonald's project at approximately $300,000.
The property owners did not petition to annex the property to
Sandy City.
On September 18, 1987, Sandy City protested the Chevron
application, indicating that "Sandy City is currently
considering annexation of the property and the annexation will
require an independent consideration of proper zoning for this
property." It also unsuccessfully petitioned the Salt Lake
1. Under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-16 (1987), an appeal from a
zoning decision must be made within the time and according to
the procedure specified by the board of county commissioners.
While these regulations are not a part of this record, there is
no dispute that Sandy City failed to appeal the rezoning
pursuant to these regulations.

County Commission to reconsider and amend its previously passed
zoning ordinance•
On October 13, 1987, the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission approved the Chevron conditional use application.
On October 14, 1987, Sandy City appealed this decision. The
Salt Lake County Planning Commission, following several public
hearings, denied Sandy City's appeal and entered findings of
fact.
Sandy City then appealed the conditional use decision to
the Salt Lake County Commission, which held a hearing on
December 9, 1987. The Salt Lake County Commission affirmed the
Salt Lake County Planning Commission's grant of the Chevron
conditional use permit, finding that the required statutory
procedure had been followed and that the grant of the
conditional use permit was in the community's interest. Sandy
City then brought this action in the district court.
On January 18, 1988, Salt Lake County filed with the
district court the affidavit of Helen Christiansen, the Salt
Lake Planning Commission's administrative assistant, and the
minutes of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission's September
22 and October 13, 1987 meetings, at which Chevron's
conditional use permit application had been discussed and
interested parties had presented evidence. Subsequently, Sandy
City submitted an affidavit indicating that the projected cost
of the Chevron development was between $660,000 to $760,000,
and that the cost of the McDonald's development would be
between $900,000 and $1,100,000. Simultaneously, Salt Lake
County submitted the minutes of the April 28, 1987 meeting of
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission, which involved
discussion of the zoning change, along with Helen
Christiansen's authenticating affidavit. All parties moved for
summary judgment.
Sandy City then moved to strike Salt Lake County's
affidavits, alleging that they failed to conform to the
requirements of rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Chevron responded by filing an affidavit indicating
that the building value of the proposed Chevron station was
$175,000.
On February 4, 1988, the day before the hearing on Salt
Lake County's motion for summary judgment, Sandy City's
attorney moved for additional discovery time pursuant to rule
56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

During the hearing on February 5, 1988, Salt Lake County
requested permission to introduce into evidence the certified
record of the administrative hearings. These records included
the previously submitted commission minutes, with additional
maps and supporting materials. Sandy City's counsel objected,
stating that he did not know what the administrative record
contained and, thus, the record was prejudicial. The district
court overruled Sandy City's objection and allowed the record
to be entered into evidence. On February 19, 1988, Salt Lake
County submitted the minutes of the December 9, 1987 meeting of
the Salt Lake County Commission, containing the appeal of the
conditional use permit grant, along with the administrative
assistant's supporting affidavit.
Salt Lake County filed the complete certified
administrative record with the district court on March 3,
1988. On March 15, 1988, the district court entered its
decision, finding that the Salt Lake County Planning Commission
had properly issued the conditional use permit, and that
defendants' actions did not violate the annexation statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 (1986). It granted summary judgment
in favor of defendants and dismissed Sandy City's action.
Subsequently, Sandy City unsuccessfully moved for an injunction
on the development of the property during the pendency of the
appeal. It then brought this appeal.
On appeal, Sandy City challenges the summary judgment,
first arguing that there were substantial issues of material
fact making summary judgment improper because: (1) Salt Lake
County untimely submitted the adminstrative record in violation
of rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) Salt
Lake County's administrative record and affidavits were
untimely filed in violation of rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure; (3) the affidavits and other evidence
presented by Chevron violated rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure by lacking an adequate evidentiary foundation;
(4) the trial court erred in refusing to grant Sandy City's
rule 56(f) motion for further discovery; and (5) there were
substantial issues of material fact in the record. Sandy
City's second major assignment of error is that the trial court
erroneously interpreted Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-418 and
10-1-4(11) (1986) by ruling that (1) to preclude urban
development of the property at issue, Sandy City had to
formally declare its intention to annex it prior to the
occurrence of the events leading to this lawsuit, and (2) the
Chevron development, and possibly the McDonald's development,
did not constitute "urban development" under section 10-1-4(11).

I.

FACTUAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Before we address Sandy Cityfs contentions, however, it
is necessary to examine the scope of our review in cases
dealing with summary judgment and municipal zoning issues.2
In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court
"consider[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party, and affirm[s] only where it appears there is no
genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where,
even according to the facts as contended by the losing party,
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.H
BriQQS v, Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)*
It is well established in Utah that "courts of law cannot
substitute their judgment in the area of zoning regulations for
that of the [municipality*s] governing body.H Navlor v. Salt
Lake Citv Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 29 (1965)
(footnote omitted)* Instead, the courts afford a comparatively
wide latitude of discretion to administrative bodies charged
with the responsibility of zoning, as well as endowing their
actions with a presumption of correctness and validity, because
of the complexity of factors involved in the matter of zoning
and the specialized knowledge of the administrative body.
Cottonwood Heights Citizen Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 593 P.2d
138, 140 (Utah 1979). Thus, the courts will not consider the
wisdom, necessity, or advisability or otherwise interfere with
a zoning determination unless "it is shown that there is no
reasonable basis to justify the action taken." Id.
In a zoning action, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-15 (1986)
indicates that an aggrieved party may "maintain a plenary
action for relief" from any decision of the municipal body
within thirty days of the filing of the decision. .The Utah
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he statutory language 'plenary
action for relief therefrom' presupposes the continued
existence of the administrative action, thus suggesting an
appeal rather than a trial #e novo." Xanthos v. Board of
Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). However, "[t]he
2. Sandy City relies upon annexation statutes and
characterizes some of the issues as annexation-related, however
this appeal is from the grant of a conditional use permit, a
zoning function.

nature and extent of the review depends on what happened below
as reflected by a true record of the proceedings/ viewed in the
light of accepted due process requirements." Denver & Rio
Grande W. R.R. Co, v. Central Weber Sewer Improvement Dist., 4
Utah 2d 105/ 287 P.2d 884/ 887 (1955). The supreme court also
found/ in Xanthos, that where a hearing has proceeded in
accordance with due process requirements/ the reviewing court
can look only to the record/ which consists of the hearing
minutes along with the formal findings and order. Xanthos, 685
P.2d at 1034. However/ where no record is preserved/ and there
is, consequently/ nothing to review# the reviewing court may
take evidence. Id. While this evidence is not necessarily
limited to the evidence presented below# the reviewing court
may not retry the case on the merits or substitute its judgment
for that of the municipal body. Id.
Because an administrative record has been preserved in
the present circumstance/ we find that this matter should be
reviewed on the record/ and that a de novo trial is
inappropriate.
Under these standards of review# we now examine Sandy
City's claims that the trial court improperly granted summary
judgment on evidentiary issues.
A.

Admission of Administrative Record

First/ Sandy City alleges that Salt Lake County untimely
submitted the administrative record in violation of rule 6(d)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It argues that rule 6(d)
requires supporting affidavits to be submitted at the time a
party files a motion for summary judgment/ and that the
administrative record is analogous to a supporting affidavit.
Because the County submitted the administrative record during
the hearing on the motion for summary judgment/ rather than
beforehand/ and/ consequently/ failed to give Sandy City notice
of the contents of the record/ Sandy City concludes that the
trial court should not haveA considered the evidence contained
in this record in arriving at its summary judgment. On the
other hand/ the County argues that the Rules of Civil Procedure
do not set forth any specific procedure for certifying an
administrative record from a county commission to the district
court/ so rule 6(d) is inapplicable here because it deals only
with the filing of affidavits.
In relevant part/ rule 6(d) states:

When a motion is supported by an
affidavit/ the affidavit shall be served
with the motion; and# except as otherwise
provided in Rule 59(c)# opposing
affidavits may be served not later than 1
day before the hearing/ unless the court
permits them to be served at some other
time.
Prior to the hearing before the district court on
February 5/ 1988/ the County submitted the minutes of the Salt
Lake County Planning Commission hearings held on April 28, May
12/ September 22/ October 13# and October 27/ 1987/ along with
authenticating affidavits• These minutes contained testimony
on all of the disputed issues. The record which the County
moved to be placed into evidence during the district court
hearing contained these minutes/ accompanied by some
documentation and a large quantity of plat maps# but did not
add materially to the relevant information already before the
court. The court admitted this record into evidence over the
strenuous objections of Sandy City# stating that "everything
down there is not essential to a determination of these
motions. And I think that quite apart from this# [even] if the
court disregarded this# it will have before it sufficient
undisputed facts of law to make decisions in the matter."
Subsequently, the court admitted into evidence/ as part of the
record/ the minutes of the Salt Lake County Commission hearing
held on December 9, 1987/ which had not previously been
available/ and various documents that were specifically
requested by Sandy City's attorney.
Our review of the record/ including the administrative
record submitted to the court/ indicates that if there was any
error in admitting the administrative record/ it was harmless
because it was essentially cumulative with respect to the
evidence already before the court. Further/ some of the
subsequently admitted evidence was admitted at Sandy City's
request.
However# we find that the trial court did not err in
admitting the administrative record at the time of trial. If
we follow rule 6(d) literally/ styling the administrative
record as the equivalent of an affidavit in support of a motion
for summary judgment/ the documents must be served not later
than one day before the hearing unless the court permits them
to be served at some other time. The court/ therefore/ has
discretion to admit such documents at other times, including

during the hearing. In this case, the court admitted documents
during and after the hearing, in response to requests made by
both parties.
However, there are limitations to this discretion.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has found that the notice
provisions of rule 6(d) are not hard and fast, it has stated
that a trial court may dispense with technical compliance to
them only if there is satisfactory proof that a party had
"actual notice and time to prepare to meet the questions raised
by the motion of an adversary." Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d
423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974) (footnote omitted); see also
Western States Thrift & Loan Co, v. Blomcruist, 29 Utah 2d 58,
504 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972); Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269,
373 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1962).
Although Sandy City objected to the admission of the
administrative record on the ground that it did not know what
it contained and, therefore, was unprepared to argue against
it, the trial court properly denied this objection because the
entire record was a matter of public record, had been on file
for a substantial period of time prior to the hearing, and both
parties had access to it. Further, significant portions of the
record, in the form of the commission minutes, were already
before the court and Sandy City had ample opportunity to become
familiar with them. We find no abuse of discretion in the
courtfs ruling.
B.

Adequate Evidentiary Foundation

Sandy City's next claim of error is that the affidavits
and other evidence presented by Chevron and the other
defendants violate rule 56 of. the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
because they lacked an adequate evidentiary foundation.
The relevant portion of rule 56(e) states that
[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Inadmissible
evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, D & L Supply V. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah
1989); Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins, Co,, 771 P.2d
693, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); so an affidavit which does not
meet the requirements of rule 56(e) is subject to a motion to
strike. Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah
H

64, 498 P.2d 352, 353-54 (1972); see also Blomauist, 504 P.2d
at 1020-21 (an affidavit containing statements made only "on
information and belief is insufficient and will be
disregarded).
Sandy City moved to strike defendants' affidavits for
their failure to conform to these requirements. In its motion
to strike, Sandy City attacked defendant Chevron's memorandum
in support of its motion for summary judgment and the affidavit
of Helen J. Christiansen, along with its attached exhibits, to
the extent that they were used to establish the allegations set
forth in Chevron's memorandum,
Helen J. Christiansen's affidavits served to establish
that she was the custodian of the record before the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission and that, on the basis of her
personal knowledge, the hearing minutes and a copy of
McDonald's Corporation's application for a conditional use
permit were the correct records of the Salt Lake County
Planning Commission. Under rules 902(4) and 1005 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, public records are admissible as an
exception to the general rule excluding hearsay evidence if
they are "certified as correct by the custodian." Utah R.
Evid. 902(4). Therefore, Ms. Christiansen's affidavit
conformed to rule 56(e) with regard to the admission of the
exhibits as portions of the administrative record before the
Salt Lake County Planning Commission. As such, they are
admissible evidence and are not subject to a motion to strike.
Sandy City challenges various statements made in these
minutes as being without evidentiary foundation. These
allegations, however, go to the merits of granting the
conditional use permit and not to any procedural defects.
Therefore, we are not concerned with them under our standard of
review. Consequently, we find Sandy City's objections to the
foundation of statements made in the record to be without merit.
C.

Further Discovery

Sandy City argues that the district court erred in
refusing to permit it to conduct further discovery pursuant to
rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(f)
provides that a court may continue a motion for summary
judgment to permit the moving party to obtain affidavits or
take depositions. Hunt v. Hurst. 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah
1990). Rule 56(f) reads as follows:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify his opposition
the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is
just.
It is generally held that rule 56(f) motions should be
granted liberally to provide adequate opportunity for
discovery/ Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311/ 313 (Utah 1984)t
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838/ 841 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987); because information gained during discovery may
create genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d
275/ 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). However/ courts are unwilling
to -spare the litigants from their own lack of diligence/"
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841 (quoting Hebert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d
218/ 222 (1st Cir. 1984)), so do not grant rule 56(f) motions
when dilatory or lacking in merit. Reeves v. Geiav
Pharmaceutical, Inc.. 764 P.2d 636/ 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Downtown Athletic Club. 740 P.2d at 278-79.
A rule 56(f) movant must file an affidavit to preserve
his or her contention that summary judgment should be delayed
pending further discovery. Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841. In this
affidavit/ the movant must explain how the requested
continuance will aid his or her opposition to summary
judgment. Id. The trial court has discretion to determine
whether the reasons stated in a rule 56(f) affidavit are
adequate. Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639.
Sandy City filed an affidavit with the court along with
its rule 56(f) motion/ stating that it had been unable to take
defendants1 depositions or to obtain a certified copy of
certain county commission minutes. It indicated that it wanted
to pursue additional discovery which would show that: (1) the
proposed use of the property contradicted the county master
plan and that insufficient evidence had been presented to the
County Planning Commission to demonstrate conformity with the
plan; (2) the proposed zoning would not contribute to the
general well-being of the neighborhood; (3) the proposed use
would be detrimental to the health/ safety/ and general welfare
of persons residing in the vicinity; (4) the true scope/ costs/
and impact of the development was not accurately and fully

communicated to the county officials during the decision-making
process; and (5) the costs.of the development would
substantially exceed $750,000.
To determine whether this affidavit was sufficient to
merit a rule 56(f) continuance, several factors must have been
considered:
(1) Were the reasons articulated in the
Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or is the
party against whom summary judgment is
sought merely on a "fishing expedition"
for purely speculative facts after
substantial discovery has been conducted
without producing any significant
evidence? (2) Was there sufficient time
since the inception of the lawsuit for the
party against whom the summary judgment is
sought to use discovery procedures, and
thereby cross-examine the moving party?
(3) If discovery procedures were timely
initiated, was the non-moving party
afforded an appropriate response?
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841; see also Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639;
Downtown Athletic Club, 740 P.2d at 278.
In determining if Sandy City's request for further
discovery was meritorious, we first consider the relevant
standard of review. As we noted above, in municipal zoning
decisions, the courts do not consider the wisdom, necessity, or
advisability of particular actions. See Sandv Citv v. Citv of
South Jordan, 652 P.2d 1316, 1318-19 (Utah 1982). Instead, the
reviewing court may consider whether the municipality acted in
conformance with its enabling statutes and ordinances pursuant
to its comprehensive plan. * Navlor v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 16
Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 (1965). The court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the municipality on the
merits of these issues, however. Id. at 129.
The trial record contained evidence as to Salt Lake
County's enabling statutes, ordinances, and plans. It also
indicated that the Salt Lake County Commission considered
evidence with respect to all the issues on which Sandy City
wished to perform additional discovery. The Salt Lake County
Commission made findings of fact going to the merits of these

issues.3 Discovery relating to the merits of the issues was
improper under the standard of review# but could properly be
held with respect to enabling statutes and procedural issues.
However, there was already substantial evidence on the record
regarding the relevant enabling statutes and plans. Further,
Sandy City did not allege in its affidavit that it needed
additional time to discover procedural errors committed by Salt
Lake County in granting the conditional building permit.
Therefore/ we find that the trial court could reasonably
3.

The Salt Lake County Commission findings state# in part:
1. The estimated cost of the
development is approximately $175,000
. . . .

2. This development is consistent
with the intent of the Salt Lake
County Master Plan by placing
commercial development at major
intersections within the county. The
Little Cottonwood District Plan was
generally intended to be applicable
through 1985 and the map is now
outdated in this immediate area.
Since the adoption of the plan in
1976/ Sandy City rezoned the
northeast corner of 10600 South 1300
East to commercial/ which changed the
character of the intersection.
Additional commercial development is
now appropriate at this intersection
and is consistent with the existing
development approved by Sandy City.
3. The development will provide
additional gasoline services which
are needed and desirable in the
neighborhood and community. . . .
4. The development is buffered from
adjacent residential uses by property
zoned R-M and will not be detrimental
to the health/ safety or general
welfare of persons residing or
working in the vicinity or injurious
to property or improvements in the
vicinity. The traffic engineer has
reviewed and approved the
application. Upon compliance with
the conditions required by the
Planning Commission, the development
will be an attractive addition to the
community.
5. The proposed use will comply with
the regulation and conditions of the
Zonina Ordinance.

conclude that the reasons Sandy City articulated in its
affidavit would produce only cumulative evidence and# so, were
inadequate to merit a continuance under rule 56(f)*
Further, Sandy City had sufficient time and opportunity
during the pendency of the action before the county commissions
to develop and present evidence
in its favor and to determine
and refute the defendants0 evidence. The record indicates that
on August 5, 1987, the Salt Lake County Commission adopted the
zoning ordinance allowing commercial development on the
property at issue, following hearings on the issue held in
April and May of 1987. Sandy City objected to the rezoning at
this time but failed to appeal. On August 26, 1987,
Postero-Blecker applied for the Chevron conditional use
permit. Sandy City protested the application on September 18,
1987, and subsequently was involved in several public hearings
on the issue before both the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission and the Salt Lake County Commission, at which it had
ample opportunity to present evidence. Sandy City appealed'to
the district court in December 1987. The hearing on the
summary judgment motion was finally held on February 5, 1988,
nearly a year after the initial zoning hearings had taken
place. As stated previously, the court will not use a rule
56(f) motion to shield the movant from his or her lack of
diligence.
Finally, in a rule 56(f) motion,
[t]he mere averment of exclusive knowledge
or control of the facts by the moving
party is not adequate: the opposing party
must show to the best of his ability what
facts are within the movant's exclusive
knowledge or control; what steps have been
taken to obtain the desired information
pursuant to discovery procedures under the
Rules; and that he is desirous of taking
advantage of these discovery procedures.
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 840-41 (quoting 2 J. Moore, W. Taggart &
J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice par. 56.24 (2nd ed.
1987)). Sandy City's affidavit did not comply with these
requirements. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Sandy City's rule 56(f)
motion.
D.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact

Sandy City argues that the court failed to consider
evidence which created the following genuine issues of material
fact: (1) Sandy City's willingness to annex, as shown by its
express declaration in its annexation policy declaration and
its attorney's statements before the Salt Lake County Planning

Commission; (2) that the projected cost of the Chevron project
exceeded $750,000, as shown by a certified appraisal setting
the cost as between $660,000 and $760,000; (3) that the Chevron
station was only part of a larger scheme to develop the
4.18-acre parcel# in that the Chevron station would take only
1/6 of the parcel, the property owners' represented that the
property would be a "commercial subdivision/" and that they
would be the sole developers of the entire tract; (4) that the
cost for the entire development/ excluding the cost of the
land/ would exceed $750/000; and (5) the development was not in
compliance with the county master plan and county ordinances
which called for rural use of the subject property/ and would
create traffic hazards and planning problems.
Many of these issues are actually issues of law. The
only issues of fact are the projected cost of the project and
whether the proposed development was in compliance with the
county master plan and county ordinances. As we have noted
above, these issues were discussed and evidence was presented
before the county commissions/ which entered written findings
and decided them on their merits. Because their findings were
supported by evidence/ we do not disturb them on review. See
USX Corp, v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883/ 885-86 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (administrative agency's factual findings will not
be disturbed unless they are -arbitrary and capricious").
II.

LEGAL ISSUES

We next address Sandy City's contention that the trial
court erred in its interpretation and application of Utah Code
Ann. § 10-2-418 (1986) and § 10-1-4(11) (1986). Because
summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than
fact/ the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial
court's legal conclusions.. Bonham v. Morgan, 102 Utah Adv.
Rep. 8/ 9 (1989) (per curiam); Parents Against Drunk Drivers v.
Graystone Pines Homeowner's Ass'n, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46
(Ct. App. 1990); Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie &
Bushnell, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29 (Ct. App. 1990).
A.

Annexation Procedure

Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 prohibits urban development
"within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated
territory which the municipality has proposed for municipal
expansion in its policy declaration, if a municipality is

willing to annex the territory proposed for such development
under the standards and requirements set forth in this
chapter." (Emphasis added.) The parties disagree as to
whether Sandy City, to prevent urban development in the
disputed territory, was required under this statute to formally
declare its intention to annex the territory prior to the
events leading to this lawsuit.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-414 (1986) requires a municipality,
prior to annexing unincorporated territory of more than five
acres, to adopt a policy declaration indicating the standard
under which it is willing to annex the territory. Sandy City
argues that it expressly declared its willingness to annex the
property before initiation of the present lawsuit by (1)
promulgating a general policy declaration indicating its
willingness to annex the property, if petitioned, along with
twenty other parcels; and (2) its counsel*s direct statement to
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission that it was willing to
annex the property. The trial court found that Sandy City was
obliged to make a formal declaration of intent to annex, in
addition to its general policy declaration, to invoke the
protection of section 10-2-414.
Even though Sandy City, in its master policy declaration,
had indicated its interest in annexing the property should the
property owners so petition, the property owners never
petitioned, nor did Sandy City attempt to annex the property on
its own. Further, it did not appeal the county's initial
zoning decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-9 (1986), and
raise this issue at that time. Instead, it waited to raise the
issue on the subsequent grant of the conditional use permit,
where the relevant issues do not include the proposed use of
the land or any annexation issue, but only whether the proposed
use comports with the previously enacted zoning regulations and
county master plan. Because Sandy City could and should have
raised this issue earlier, we find that it is precluded from
raising it now. See Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d
1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As such, we do not address
the issue of whether Sandy City was required under section
10-2-418, in addition to its master policy declaration, to
officially declare
its willingness to annex a territory of less
than five acres.4 Consequently, we find Sandy City's
objection to be without merit.
4. We note that the property at issue consists of 4.18 acres
while section 10-2-418 applies to parcels consisting of at
least five acres. Therefore, section 10-2-418 would be
inapplicable in the present case.

We affirm the trial courtfs finding against Sandy City on
this issue, even though we assign a totally different rationale
than that used by the trial court. See, e.g., Ostler v.
Ostler. 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Ct. App. 1990).
B.

Urban Development

Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 (1986) states that -[u]rban
development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half
mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area which the
municipality M has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy
declaration.
"Urban development" is defined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-1-104(11) (1986) as "a housing subdivision involving more
than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre
per residential unit or a commercial or industrial development
for which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all
phases."
Pursuant to its objective of preventing the proposed
development of the disputed territory/ Sandy City argues that
the trial court erred in finding the value of the proposed
development did not exceed $750/000 because (1) the definition
of ••urban development" under section 10-1-104 includes not only
the value of the building itself/ but also the cost of the land
and the value of the building fixtures; and (2) the $750/000
figure encompasses all commercial ventures to be built on the
disputed territory. Salt Lake County, on the other hand/
alleges that the only relevant cost under the definition is
that of the building alone and does not include the land and
building fixtures, and that the $750/000 figure applies to each
individual development venture separately initiated on the
property.
Again, because Sandy City has not made any attempt to
annex the territory and should have raised its objections to
urban development at the time of the zoning determination
rather than at the subsequent granting of a conditional use
permit, we decline to interpret this statute. Because the
interpretation of section LO-2-414 would have no relevance to
the propriety of the county's grant of a conditional use permit
under our standard of review, any interpretation we would make
would be an advisory opinion/ which we decline to issue under
well established standards of judicial review. See Ringwood v.
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (where the result in the prior action constitutes the
full relief available to the parties on the same claim/ or
where the issue could and should have been litigated in the

prior action, the claim is precluded under the doctrine of res
judicata); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 33 (Ct,
App. 1990) (there is a longstanding judicial policy in Utah to
avoid a^yiecgry opinions), therefore, we find this issue to be
wii"
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STATEMENT OF BASIS FOR PETITION
The City is appreciative of the attention and courtesy extended by the court to the
parties at oral argument. However, the court's Opinion, filed one year thereafter, departs
from both the facts and law argued by the parties and relied upon by the lower court. The
passage of time and this detour from the refining process of briefing and argument resulted
in several errors of fact and law which, if corrected, should materially alter this court's
opinion.
These errors are not merely technical. They form the basis upon which the merits
of the entire action were avoided. They are thus fundamental to the rights of the parties.
They also involve important public policy as set forth more fully herein. Correction of these
errors will promote principles of justice, sound development and local governance.
Appellant respectfully requests that this court review the statutes and case law and
apply them to the actual record as discussed herein, and to grant appellant the opportunity
for oral argument on such issues as are presented in this petition, as provided in Rule 35
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH ZONING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTES
HAVE BEEN MISAPPREHENDED
A

THE COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE JURISDICTIONAL NATURE
OF THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTE AND TO APPLY A
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO STATUTES OF THAT
CLASS.
Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 (1986) states that "[u]rban development shall not be

approved or permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area
which the municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration."

"Urban development" is defined to include "a commercial or industrial development for
which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases."1
This statute limits Salt Lake County's jurisdiction territorially as well as in subject
matter. It expressly forbids the County to "approve or permit" commercial development in
excess of $750,000 within one-half mile of Sandy City. County ordinances also prohibit the
County from approving use permits which contradict the master plan.2
A central issue in Sandy City's appeal from summary judgment by the district court
is whether respondents' development exceeded $750,000 in costs so as to deprive the
County of approval authority. The County Director of Development Services, testifying
before the Planning Commission, confirmed that "when the entire site is developed it will
exceed the $750,000 figure."3 Developers testifying at that same hearing confirmed that
their costs for just the first two pads was $760,000.4 A later MAI appraisal showed that the
costs of the entire development indeed far exceeded the $750,000 urban development
restriction.5
Thus, the evidence before the County was entirely consistent - as it is before this
Court - the costs of the entire project will exceed $750,000. But, Salt Lake County is
subject to the same tendencies as other large bureaucracies — it seeks to maximize its own
interests and authority. Despite the testimony of the developers and its own staff, it found

1
2

UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(11) (1986).
R22.

3

Rill.

4

R108.

5

R133-135.
2

that development costs were less than $750,000.
On appeal, this Court acknowledged that it could consider whether the County
exceeded its authority under the Urban Development Statute, but refused to do so.6 It
cited Na)lor v. Salt Lake City Corporation7 for the proposition that the court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the County on the merits of such an issue.
The Naylor case does not support such a conclusion. The statutory authority of the
City was not in question there. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he statutory
authority of the City's governing body to enact zoning ordinances and amending the same
is not questioned" in that case.8 Thus the Naylor court merely confirmed that courts should
not ordinarily interfere with matters of administrative discretion.
Statutory authority is the central issue in the instant appeal. Jurisdictional issues are
not discretionary and judicial deference has no proper place where the County lacks
authority to act. The Supreme Court has confirmed that review latitude is recognized only
where counties act within their authority:
"County zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of the
applicable zoning ordinances, and are not at liberty either to grant or deny
conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards. Within the
boundaries established by such standards, however, the zoning authority is
afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded a strong
presumption of validity. Where such decisions have been made, courts will
not interfere unless they are plainly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable or an
abuse of discretion."9

6

Opinion, p. 11.

7

16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Utah 1965).

8

Id., at p. 28.

9

Thurston v. Cache Cty, 626 P.2d 440, 444-445 (Utah 1981). Emphasis added. See also Peatross v. Board
of County Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), where the Court made clear that deference will be granted
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard only if the lower agency was "acting within the scope of its
authority."
3

There is hardly a more important issue before any court than the unlawful use of
governmental power. Courts have been established to check such excesses. Salt Lake
County and its planning commission are agencies of limited jurisdiction. Their "authority"
is dependent entirely upon the terms of the statutes reposing power in them. They cannot
confer jurisdiction on themselves by making findings contrary to the evidence before them.
If the mandatory provisions of their enabling statutes are not met, they have no authority
to proceed.
The review standard applied in this appeal reverses the proper role of the courts.
Instead of serving as a check on governmental excesses, it becomes the validator of the
same. It permits administrative agencies to define their own powers in the face of evidence
which consistently denies them such powers. The Court of Appeals could not have
intended to play such a role or create such a profound precedent. The City requests that
the court reconsider the review standard it so broadly applied in this appeal.
B.

THE MUNICIPAL CODE AND BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT STATUTES
RELIED ON BY THE COURT HAVE NO APPLICATION WHATSOEVER TO
REZONINGS BY ELECTED COUNTY OFFICIALS.
The court cited two statutes selected from the Utah Municipal Code and one statute

from the enabling act for counties, as the basis for its refusal to review the merits of this
appeal.10 These statutes have no application to this appeal for the following reasons:
UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16. This statute was cited to establish that "an appeal
from a zoning decision must be made within the time and according to the procedure

Copies of each of these statutes are attached as Appendix "A."
4

specified by the board of county commissioners."11 More specifically, this section provides
a procedure for appealing alleged errors in zoning enforcement decisions to the board of
adjustment.
The record does not disclose whether Salt Lake County has ever appointed a board
of adjustment. If it has, its members are not elected officials - they are appointed by the
county commission.12 For this reason, they do not review zoning decisions.13 Their powers
are expressly limited to considering alleged errors "in the enprcement of the zoning
resolution."14
The City does not allege an error in zoning enprcement. It attacks the jurisdiction
of the County to adopt the zone itself and to issue the attendant conditional use permit.
As such, Section 17-27-16 has no application and should not have been applied to avoid
consideration of the merits of this appeal.
The Appellate Court's interpretation also contravenes Utah case law. For instance,
the Utah Supreme Court has approved a county commission's decision to not bestow on the
board of adjustment the power to issue special zoning exceptions. The county commission
elected to wield such power on its own. The Court emphasized that "the Board of
Adjustments is constituted by statute a forum for review of all administrative zoning
decisions, but nowhere is it made the exclusive repository of appellate powers."15

11

Opinion, footnote 1. A copy of this statute appears on Appendix "A."

12

UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-15.

13

Zoning is generally considered to be an act which is legislative in nature. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust
Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724, 725 (1939); GayLand v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 635
(1961); CrestviewHolladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engl Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976).
14

UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16(1). Emphasis added.
Thurston, supra, p. 446. Emphasis added.

5

Serious problems will result if the instant interpretation remains. The Court's
conclusion that zoning challenges must pursue board of adjustment appeal transfers
legislative policy-making powers from the elected officials of the County to a board which
is not responsible to the electorate. Such a construction poses immense governance
problems and promotes conflicts with the goals and objectives of local communities as
articulated by their elected representatives. Under the restrictive standard of review
imposed by the Court in this appeal, the public would have virtually no ability to overturn
a zoning by such a non-elected body. Such a serious precedent should not have been
established without some briefing or oral argument by the parties.
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-9. This statute was cited by the Court as a second basis
for its conclusion that the City did not timely appeal the County's zoning decision.16 This
section is part of the Utah Municipal Code. It establishes a procedure for appeals to city
board of adjustments from administrative decisions by city officials.

This section has

nothing to do with appeals from county zoning decisions whatsoever and should not be
applied to this case.17
Even if this section were somehow to relate to counties, it does not apply here. Like
the County's board of adjustment statute,18 it addresses only to appeals from enforcement
decisions and does not authorize the board of adjustment to invalidate the actual zones
themselves. Further, this section does not establish any time limits whatsoever for appeals.

1R

Opinion, p. 15. A copy of the statute prior to the 1989 amendment is in Appendix "A."
17

See Davis County v. Clearfeld City, 756 P.2d 704, 706-707 (Utah App. 1988), where the Court of Appeals
rejected a similar attempt to impute the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act to municipal
planning matters.
18

See Section 1, above.
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Section 10-9-9 is facially inapplicable to this action and should not be used as the
basis to avoid consideration of the merits of this appeal. Further, application of that
section in this appeal poses the same legal and governance problems as use of the County
board of adjustment statute. Its retention in the Court's decision will create a precedent
of serious consequence.
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-15. This statute was also used to establish that the City
had failed to make a timely administrative appeal from the County's rezoning.19 This
section does set a 30-day appeal period - but it is for appealing decisions by city boards of
adjustments to the district court. Like section 10-9-9, it is part of the Utah Municipal Code
and applies only to cities. Counties are not municipalities for the purposes of that code and
this section has nothing to do with County zoning decisions whatsoever.20 Even if it did
apply to counties, it does not purport to establish a time-limitation for appeals of rezoning
decisions.
The immediate effect of these errors is to deny the parties consideration of
the merits of this appeal. The long-term effect is greater. If permitted to stand, this
decision will create confusion of governance principles and likely imdermine the ability of
citizens to implement their goals and objectives through their elected officials in many
communities of our state.

Opinion, p. 15. A copy of this statute is in Appendix "A.M
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(1).
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POINT II
THE FACTUAL RECORD HAS BEEN MISSTATED
A

SANDY'S OBJECTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT WERE TIMELY AND
COMPLETE
The Appeal Court's decision acknowledges that Sandy objected to the County's

rezoning but states that such objection was untimely and incomplete. That conclusion
arose partly from misapplication of the statutes discussed in Point I above. However, some
misconstruction of the factual record was also implied in the conclusion. As shown below,
the actual appeal record does not support this criticism:
1.

There is no record that the City received notice of the rezoning hearing.21

The County only provided the City with a copy of the rezoning application and requested
its recommendation.22

The zoning application omitted the estimate of project value

required by the application form. But it did admit that the rezoning would not comply
with the County's current land use plan.23 To this admission, the City's objection added
that the plan also violated the City's Comprehensive Plan and the Crescent Community
Citizen's Report.24
2.

There was "not a specific use proposed for the overall properties" at the time

the application was made25 or when rezoning was considered.26 Value would not be

Although there is a record of constructive notice to the public. Envelope 5, Doc. 2.
22

R15-17.

23

R15.

24

R17.

25

R15.

26

Envelope 5, Document 6, p. 904.
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determined until a building permit was actually issued.27 It would have been impossible for
the City to have estimated the cost of development at that time.28 Even though there was
no project information available, the City could still inform the County that M[t]he developer
should seek annexation and zoning from Sandy." This is exactly what the City did.29
3.

At the hearing on the matter, the County Commission was briefed on Sandy's

objection to the rezoning.30 The Deputy County Attorney advised the Commission that
there may be a problem with the development meeting the urban development restrictions
of section 10-2-418 U.C.A., depending on how the development plans were eventually
presented. He then stated that "Sandy could object to that anyway," presumably at the
time the plans were submitted.31
4.

Based on representations of the Deputy County Attorney and other staff

members, the County Commission approved the rezoning.32 The ordinance was published
on August 20, 1987.33
5.

Within thirty days thereafter, the City petitioned the County for a rehearing

of its zoning decision.34 That petition reiterated that "[djevelopment on the property would

R i l l . Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13.
28

The proposal was so loose that County staff reported "there is a possibility that the developer will ask for
a different zone depending on the market.*4 The zoning was thereupon approved by the County Commission
without any knowledge of actual uses to be placed on the property.
a

R17.

30

Envelope 5, Document 6.
31

Id., p. 906.

32

Id., pp. 906-907.

33

R19.
9

constitute 'urban development' and that the property owners had not attempted to annex
the property to Sandy City as required by 10-2-418, U.C.A. 1953." The petition also stated
that "[t]he granting of the RM/zc and C-2 zoning on this property contradicts the Little
Cottonwood District Development Plan which calls for rural residential use on the
property."35
6.

The County Commission reviewed the City's petition but did not permit City

representatives to speak.36 The Commission denied the City's request and directed that if
the City wished to pursue its objection, it should do so before the Planning Commission
through the conditional use process.37
7.

The City complied with the County Commissions directive and took its protest

to the Planning Commission raising repeated objections to the statutory and master plan
violations described above.38 When that was unsuccessful, the City filed a timely appeal to
the County Commission as required by County ordinance.39 When its protests were rejected
there, the City promptly initiated this action in conformance with the process defined by the
County Attorney.40

35

id.

36

T6. Also, Envelope 5, Document 7, p, 1190. Compare with Opinion which asserts that Sandy had "ample
opportunity to present evidence." p. 13.
37

Envelope 5, Documents 8 - 9 .

38

R27-29.

39

R22. County Ordinance 19.84.110 (Appeal of Planning Commission Decision).

40

"Mr. [Kent] Lewis responded if the conditional use is issued because they are convinced that it is not
covered by the half-mile (sic), then Sandy's option is to seek an injunction agains(sic) the developer and the
county and a legal determination could be made as to whether or not the half mile is applicable." Envelope 5,
Document 9, p. 1114.
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The above chronology illustrates that (1) the City raised its development objections
prior to the County's rezoning hearing; (2) evidence of development costs was not available
to the City at the time of rezoning and could not have accompanied the City's objection;
(3) at the time of rezoning, the County understood that the project may violate urban
development restrictions; (4) the County nevertheless rezoned the property, deferring its
decision on the legal question and the City's objection to the development until a specific
development was proposed; (5) the City timely requested reconsideration of the County's
decision; (6) the request for zoning reconsideration was denied and the City was directed
to pursue its objection through the conditional use process; (7) the City complied with the
County's direction and fully participated at all stages of the conditional use process as
defined by ordinance; and (8) through this action, the City timely appealed the rezoning
and conditional use permits in the manner defined by the County Attorney.
Thus, the City was not remiss in raising objections or untimely in appealing this
development. The court's decision should be corrected to reflect the actual record of these
events and the merits of the City's appeal should be addressed in that process.
B.

THE COUNTY'S FINDINGS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
The Court of Appeals refused to consider any factual issues because the County had

made findings as to development costs which were "supported by evidence."41

This

conclusion is inaccurate. As stated above, the County's own staff testified that development
costs for the site would exceed $750,000:
"Ken Jones, Director of Development Services, said in the past the County
has not considered the value of the land because this varies from day to day,
however, the value of the development is determined when the building
permit is acquired. He would not want his staff to advise people to purchase

*1 Opinion, p. 14.
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a 10 acre parcel, get it zoned, and then cut it up to avoid annexation. In this
particular case it is safe to assume that when the entire site is developed it will
exceed the $750,000figure.This legal issue will have to be addressed with the
cooperation of Salt Lake County and Sandy City."42
The developers confirmed that they were in fact cutting up the parcel and that their
costs for just the first two of numerous building pads was $760,000.43 No evidence was
introduced to refute this testimony.44 The County's findings therefore directly contradict the
undisputed evidence and the appeal court's deference to such findings was misplaced. The
court's decision should be reconsidered in order to state the facts contained in the record
on appeal.
POINT III
THE COURTS DECISION WILL CAUSE
UNFAIRNESS IF NOT CORRECTED
The City respectfully suggests that the foregoing errors of law and fact will cause
unfairness to the parties if not corrected. The following are examples of this effect:
1.

The principle basis of the court's ruling was not raised as an affirmative

defense by any of the parties to this action, nor was it ever briefed, argued, or considered
by the parties, the agencies, or lower court. Thus, the parties have been entirely deprived
of the opportunity to address the issue upon which their rights were determined.

R i l l . Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13.
Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 10.
44

R108. Chevron agents did make statements as to costs on the first pad. However, they did not address
costs for the entire development. Further, such statements were without foundation and the County's findings
even as to that pad violated the "residuum of competent evidence rule." Utah courts have held that a residuum
of competent legal evidence must support findings of an administrative agency. This rule is discussed on p. 18
of Appellant's reply brief.
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2.

The court's decision that the City should have followed some alternative

appeal procedure is contrary to the procedures outlined by the County to the City orally in
the record and by ordinance. The City followed all those procedures and made its
objections in a timely fashion at each stage. Where the parties have agreed on an appeal
procedure which is consistent with all applicable statutes and ordinances, it promotes
unfairness to refuse rudimentary discovery and, in fact, to invalidate an action on the basis
that an alternative procedure was not selected.

The court would advance justice by

providing the same presumption to the County's defined grievance procedure as it has to
all other aspects of the County's decisions.
3.

The court's decision to permit a local government to submit massive amounts

of evidentiary materials at summary judgment hearings, without advance notice to the
parties and without permitting a recess to review the same, and after the opposing party has
completed its briefing and oral argument, creates a precedent certain to undermine the
ability of future citizens to avoid the ambush inherent in such a procedure.45
4.

To conclude that the City "had sufficient time and opportunity during the

pendency of the action before the county commissions to develop and present evidence in
its favor and to determine and refute the defendants' evidence"46 overlooks the fact that the
proposed projects had not been disclosed or that development costs were otherwise

The court seems to have assumed that the approximately six inches of documents submitted by the County
in this action were maintained by the County prior to the action in the same condition as they were presented
to the district court. That assumption is not supported by the record and is not accurate. The record was
assembled by the County from numerous sources for purposes of the summary judgment hearing. Some
selectivity is inherent in such a process as evidenced by the fact that the record was determined to be incomplete
when presented and had to be supplemented. If the county attorney was unable to locate all the relevant records
for the hearing it is difficult to see how a citizen of the county can be assumed to have complete advance
knowledge of the same.
46

Opinion, p. 13.
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unavailable from the developers. It was the County, not the City, which failed in its burden
to require evidence of project costs and compliance with the master plan, so as to establish
a competent basis for its jurisdiction to proceed.47
5.

When the City was finally able to obtain a professional cost appraisal on its

own, demonstrating that the development would surely exceed $750,000, such estimates had
no effect on the County's decision to proceed with its approvals.48 To permit County
jurisdiction to be upheld solely on statements without competent evidentiary foundation
encourages the County to continue to ignore competent evidence when presented, contrary
to the facts and in its self interest.
6.

The court's conclusion that zoning challenger must pursue appeals to boards

of adjustment has the effect of transfering legislative policy-making powers from the elected
officials of the County to a board which is not responsible to the electorate. Such a
construction undermines representative government and separation of powers principles.
It also promotes administrative conflicts with the goals and objectives of local communities
as articulated by their elected representatives.

CONCLUSION
The Appellant thanks the court for the extensive time it has taken to review this
case and the courtesy provided to the parties at oral argument. However, on the basis of
the foregoing discussion, it is respectfully submitted that there are significant factual and

County ordinance 19.84.090 places the evidentiary burden on the county to demonstrate conformance with
the intent of the county master plan. R22.
48

Envelope 1, Document 11, p. 1389. (McDonald Appeal)
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legal issues which compel a reconsideration of the court's decision. The Appellant also
believes that oral argument is appropriate in the circumstances as provided for in Rule 35
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DATED this

day of June, 1990.

Walter R. Miller
Sandy City Attorney
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Walter R. Miller
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APPENDIX "A"
10-9-9. Appeals to board — Time — Persons entitled —
Transmission of papers.
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved
or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by
any decision of the administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken within a
reasonable time as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the officer
from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of adjustment a notice of
appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom the appeal is
taken shall forthwith transmit to the board of adjustment all the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken.

10-9-15. Judicial review of board's decision — Time limitation.
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of
competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented to the
court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office of the
board.

17-27-15. Board of adjustment — Regulations — Meetings.
The board of county commissioners of any county which enacts zoning regulations under the authority of this act, shall provide for a board of adjustment
of three to five members and for the manner of the appointment of such
members. Not more than half of the members of such board may at any time
be members of the planning commission. The board of county commissioners
shall fix per diem compensation and terms for the members of such board of
adjustment, which terms shall be of such length and so arranged that the
term of at least one member will expire each year. Any member of the board of
adjustment may be removed for cause by the board of county commissioners
upon written charges and after a public hearing. Vacancies shall be filled for
the unexpired term in the same manner as in the case of original appointments. The board of county commissioners may appoint associate members of
such board, and in the event that any regular member be temporarily unable
to act owing to absence from the county, illness, interest in a case before the
board or any other cause, his place may be taken during such temporary
disability by an associate member designated for the purpose.
The board of county commissioners shall provide and specify in its zoning or
other resolutions general rules to govern the organization, procedure, and
jurisdiction of said board of adjustment, which rules shall not be inconsistent
with the provisions of this act, and the board of adjustment may adopt supplemental rules of procedure not inconsistent with this act or such general rules.
Any zoning resolution of the board of county commissioners may provide
that the board of adjustment may in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate principles, standards, rules, conditions and safeguards set forth in the
zoning resolution, make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent. The commissioners
may also authorize the board of adjustment to interpret the zoning maps and
pass upon disputed questions of lot lines or district boundary lines or similar
questions, as they may arise in the administration of the zoning regulations.
Meetings of the board of adjustment shall be held at the call of the chairman
and at such other times as the board in its rules of procedure may specify. The
chairman or in his absence the acting chairman, may administer oaths and
compel the attendance of witnesses. All meetings of the board of adjustment
shall be open to the public. The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings
showing the vote of each member upon each question, or if absent or failing to
vote, indicating such fact, and shall keep records of its examinations and other
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